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Zeisel: Courts for Methuselah

COURTS FOR METHUSELAH
HANS ZEISEL*

More than ten years ago two colleagues and I published a careful study
of the delay problem.1 To return to that problem is a melancholy, pedestrian,
and dismal task. Court delay has been with us too long, and it seems so
futile to continue writing and talking about it.
It is hard to understand why the United States, with its great resources,
continues to allow the ground floor of its judicial system to remain in such
disrepair. We go to the moon and our managerial abilities are unrivalled;
yet we are either unable or unwilling to secure for an injured plaintiff his
right of a prompt trial. Depending on where they can go to court, injured
parties may have to wait two or even five years. The detrimental consequences
of such delay are many.
Initially, if a plaintiff is not satisfied with the settlement offered by
the defending insurance company, he is given to understand - if not by the
insurance company, then by his own lawyer -that if he refuses the offer he
will have to wait years, a hardship few litigants are rich enough to bear.
Delay, therefore, seriously weakens the bargaining power of the injured. The
2
remote trial date forces him to accept less than his due.
Furthermore, if the case finally comes to trial, witnesses - if they are still
available - will be asked to testify about remote events, for example, exactly
what happened one hazy evening at 5:35 at the corner of Wabash Avenue
and Randolph Street, five long years ago. Thus, delay renders the careful
rules of evidence and the precision of our laws of substantive law a mockery.
Finally, court delay generates a variety of secondary evils. Pressure on
litigants to settle often creates an atmosphere in which insisting on trial
becomes almost an impropriety. Additionally, proposals emerge to reform
procedures and substantive laws for the sole (and therefore insufficient)
reason that they might reduce the workload of our courts. In the end, delay
corrodes further a commodity that is always in precariously short supply:
the citizen's respect for the courts.
THE NATuRE OF THE PROBLEM

The special nature of the delay problem is characterized by four points:
(1) For many years the Institute for Judicial Administration has
audited the delay figures in state courts, revealing that delay is by no
means a universal sickness of our courts:

* Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Chicago.
1. H. ZEISE.L, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOL, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).

2. Id. ch. 2.
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TABLE 13
State Court Delay by Size of County Population
(Personal Injury Cases, 1968)
No. of Courts

County Population

DELAY IN MONTHS BETWEEN ANSWER AND TRIAL

Reporting

Average

Over 750,000

(29)

32

10
(Miami)

to

60
(Chicago)

Between 500,000
and 750,000

(30)

21

to

Under 500,000

(42)

13

4
(Delaware
County)
2
(Spokane)
2

to

47
(Suffolk
County, N.Y.)
31
(Manchester,
N.H.)
60

Total

(101)

Range

24*

to

*Average, weighted by size of county population.
Delay appears to be more prevalent in the large metropolitan courts
than in the smaller ones; but even some of the largest counties have
managed to keep delay down to a moderate level, while courts in some
of the smaller counties are marked by long delays. Note that the average
delay for all state courts is about twenty-four months.
(2) As Table 2 illustrates, delay is not a chronic disease, even for

some of the most delayed courts:
TABLE 2
Delay 1969 and 1964 (in months)

Chicago
Brooklyn
New York
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Pittsburgh

1969
60
51
51
36
31
20

1964
58
51
20
22
25
28

Delay in some courts, such as those in Los Angeles and San Francisco,
has increased during the last five years; Pittsburgh has reduced it, but for
most courts the Chicago and Brooklyn situation is typical. These courts
have a backlog of cases that impedes speedy trials, but these courts hold
their own in that they try sufficient cases to dispose of their annual input.
The situation is similar to that of a man who has owed the same
amount for a very long time, but has managed throughout that time to
pay his current expenses. All these courts need is one major cleanup
operation. Once the backlog is removed, good housekeeping should
prevent its reemergence.5
3. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY (1969).
4. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY (1970); id. (1965).
5. To be sure, the jurisdictions that now have an inordinately high delay of four or
five years must probably anticipate on some increase in the proportion of cases that will
have to be tried once the delay is removed. Cf. H. ZEISEL, H.

KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ,

note 1 supra,ch. 10.
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If this insight is correct it follows that whatever remedy is adopted
should be one with which we will be satisfied after the delay has been
cured. It would be a mistake to adopt a remedy that would permanently
lower the quality of the judicial process or the substantive law. Thus,
remedies should be of only two kinds: emergency measures, certain to be
abandoned once the problem is solved, and permanent measures that
would cure delay and at the same time raise, or at least not impair, the
quality of our judicial system.
(3) The only occasion at which a case consumes a significant amount
of the court's time is at trial.6 Gases that do not reach trial, no matter how
long they stay on the docket, even if they occasionally reappear on the
calendar, require only a negligible amount of the court's time. 7
(4) A peculiarly simple structure characterizes the delay problem.
There are three, and only three, ways of resolving it: reduce the number
of cases that must be tried; reduce the time required to try cases; or
increase the available judge time for trying cases. Unless an effective
remedy is found along at least one of these routes, it is no remedy.
The last point can be reduced to a simple mathematical formula:
(a)

(b)

(c)

Number of cases
Average time it
Court (Judge)
to be tried
X takes to try these = time necessary to
cases
try these cases
As long as the available court time is equal to the necessary court time
(c) the current input of cases into the court will be disposed of without
delay. If the court, in addition, has a backlog of cases, somehow extra
court time must be provided.
Stating the delay problem in this fashion illustrates that any remedy
must provide trial time for backlog cases; furthermore, the amount of trial
time provided is the precise measure of its remedial power.
The formula further shows that the sheer number of backlog cases is
almost irrelevant; only the cases that require trial are pertinent.
A fairly simple method of estimating the time required to remove the
backlog can also be devised: multiply the number of judges in that part of
the court by the number of years the calendar is delayed. Suppose delay in a
court has been fairly steady around three years, and ten judges have been
available. Under those circumstances roughly 30 (10 x 3) judge years will
be required to remove the backlog.
To repeat, a remedy will be effective to the extent it provides time
for trying the backlog, either by making more judge time available and
thereby increasing the right side of the equation (c) or by decreasing the
necessary trial time by reducing the left side of the equation- (a) fewer
trials or (b) shorter trials.

6. The only exception, and it is a minor one, is the time spent on pretrial. See note 31
accompanying text.
7. However, these cases often require a considerable expenditure of the lawyers' time
and hence the clients' money.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
infra and
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SOLUTIONS

Route 1: More Judges
New Judges. In the 1959 study of the delay problem, 8 this remedy was
idmost disregarded as a subject of analysis because it seemed too obvious that
the appointment of more judges would almost automatically solve the problem. Since nothing new could be said about the political merits or difficulties
of that solution, it was given short treatment.
In retrospect, viewing this solution as "too obvious" may have been overly
optimistic. Barring the unreal possibility of an unlimited expansion in the
number of judges, it appears that simply adding more judges, without adding
other measures, is far from being the radical remedy it theoretically appears
to be.
The Chicago court, for instance, in 1964 had nine full-time judges trying
jury cases in the law division. Today their number exceeds thirty, however,
despite this formidable increase the delay has remained substantially the
same. To be sure, without that increase the delay might now be considerably
larger, but such an experience indicates that remedies should always be
viewed as part of a system rather than considered in isolation. It is conceivable, for instance, that adding judges may result in fewer daily hours per
judge or in some other counterbalancing effect.
Reassignment of Judges. The division of the court experiencing delay may,
of course, obtain more judges from other parts of the court system. If some
judges in the system are underemployed, such temporary reassignment is
among the most natural, and most frequent, remedies. The more delicate
question concerns the reassignment of judges who are fully employed and
whose removal would effectuate additional delay in their own division while
reducing it elsewhere. Although not always so recognized, this is the obvious
result of certain conscious administrative practices. That is, the high average
delay of one section of the court - usually the personal injury jury division is never a natural event but always results from an arbitrary decision of the
court. With the exception of criminal cases, there apparently exists no constitutional basis for such singling out. Unfortuately, the increasing delay in
other divisions, especially the criminal one, has made reassignment of judges
as a source of relief less and less available for the personal injury area.
More Court Days and Longer Hours. This remedy is equally trivial. To
have judges work harder during more court days per year and more hours
per day is hardly a profound idea. Little can be said about this remedy
except perhaps for three remarks. First, it is well established that some courts
have shorter vacations than others, that some courts work harder than other
courts, and that some judges work harder than other judges; thus, there does
seem to be room for improvement. 9 Second, the setting and supervision of
8.

9.

JR. &B. BUCHHOLZ, note 1 supra.
Cf., e.g., H. JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS 25 (1968): "In Chicago, the city with the
H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN,
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such working standards must be left to the courts. Third, such standards
should be established and published.
Reduce Calendar Gaps. Since judge time on the bench is the only
pertinent factor, one of the more important opportunities for extending the
judge's trial time is to avoid gaps in his trial calendar.
Judges often blame lawyers for these gaps. The personal injury trial
business, judges claim, is concentrated in too few law offices. No evidence
exists, however, to support the claim that this concentration, which indeed
exists, in any way causes delay, provided the courts properly do their part.
Since delayed courts have literally thousands of cases waiting, a properly
functioning calendar system should easily reveal a case ready for trial.
So long as any case is tried that will have to be tried eventually, it does not
matter whether it is an old case or a young one.' 0
The most difficult situations involve cases that are unexpectedly settled
early in the trial. In such a situation, much valuable time can be lost if no
other case is immediately assigned.", There remain two schools of thought
regarding the best assignment system: the individual calendar in which a case
is assigned to a judge at the time it is filed, and the general calendar in which
the case is assigned only at the time of trial. Hopelessly inept research has
advanced the alleged superiority of either system.1" Apparently, a wellfunctioning general calendar in a larger court might be better able to predict
statistically the frequency of "unexpected" settlements and hence the needed
number of "on deck" cases. In any event, much hinges on adequate communication between trial judge and assignment judge.
Route 2: Shorter Trials
Abolish the Jury. The second route, cutting the time required to try a
case, also has its radical cure: follow the English example and abolish the

biggest civil backlog, this reporter has checked all 114 courtrooms in the New Civic Center
several times.
"On a typical day he found judges on the bench in only 11 of the 114 courtrooms between 9:30 and 10 anm.; 58 of the 114 benches filled between 10 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.; 45
judges sitting between 10:30 a.m. and 11 a.m.; and the same number between 11 and 11:30
a.m. Between 2:30 and 3 p.m. there were only 34 of the 114 benches with judges sitting."
I might add here a personal recollection of some years ago about the Los Angeles court.
I had come to Los Angeles to discuss the delay problem with the then presiding Judge
Burke. At some point the judge asked me whether I did not want to watch a trial. I looked
at my watch and said, "It is past 4:30, I don't expect many judges to be still on the bench."
Judge Burke smilingly took me from one courtroom to the next. As I recall it, not a single
one was empty.
10. Tauro, Court Delay and the Trial Bar, 52 JUDICATuRE 414 (1969); Zeisel, Court Delay
Caused by the Bar?, 54 A.BA.J. 886 (1968).
11.

Cf. note 18 infra and accompanying text.

12. One judge has informed the author of a recent so-called "experiment" in which
one of our major federal courts utilized three enthusiastic volunteers to show what wonders
the individual calendar can perform and suggested their success be accepted as evidence
of the efficacy of this approach generally.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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jury in personal injury cases. Such change would convert nearly eighty per
cent of present jury trials to bench trials, thereby reducing trial time in the
jury division by about one-third. 3 Abolishing the jury in personal injury
trials would indeed eliminate all delay at current levels within a foreseeable
number of years. 14 However, the decision to retain or abandon the jury in civil
cases should not be made because it may save time. Such a decision should
be made only on the merits, that is, only if it is believed that the jury should
be given up even if the courts were up-to-date. If jury trial is abolished only
because it takes more time, the result will be a court system that is up-to-date,
but substantially inferior to what presently exists. 5
Therefore, a determination must be made whether trial by a judge is
preferable to trial by jury. Initially, does there exist a substantial difference
between the way juries decide personal injury cases and the way judges
decide them? In roughly twenty per cent of these cases the jury arrives at a
liability verdict that differs from the one the judge would render. Juries and
judges also differ on the damages question: on the average, juries award
approximately twenty-five per cent higher damages than do judges.' 6 Second,
given these discrepancies, an investigation should attempt to determine when
they arise and the reasons for them. Finally, these reasons must be evaluated.
Together, the three steps permit decision concerning which adjudication is
considered superior - the judge alone or the judge with a jury.
Jury Waiver. In attempting to abrogate court delay, desirable alternatives
to abolishing the jury include devices designed to increase the voluntary
waiver of jury trials in individual cases. Unfortunately, unless improper lures
are offered or improper pressures are exerted or a local custom of jury
waiver exists, such voluntary waiver is unlikely.17 So long as the probable
jury verdict will differ from that the judge would render, and the direction
of the difference is predictable within limits, one of the litigants will find it
to his advantage to opt for the jury. Since one opter is enough in this instance,
a jury trial ordinarily will be sought.

13. Removing the jury will cut about 40* of the trial time. See, e.g., H. ZEISEL, H.
& B. BUCHHOLZ, note I supra, ch. 6. Forty per cent of 80% of all jury trials
would amount to (.40 x .80 = 32%) 1/3 over-all savings.
14. It will be quite instructive to estimate roughly the number of years required by
reference to a hypothetical example. A court that has a steady delay of 8 years would, to
begin with, require only 2/3 of 3 years, that is, 2 years for trying the backlog. Since the
court would also free 1/3 of its regular trial time, abolishing the jury would remove the
delay in that court within 6 years. Since each year the court would be able to spend 1/3
of its judge time to trying backlog cases, and 2 years require 6 one-thirds of a year.
15. See, e.g., Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. Rxv. 1055 (1964);
Zeisel, The Jury and Court Delay, 328 ANNALS 46 (1960).
16. These are data from the forthcoming volume on the civil jury, the sequel to H.
KALVEN, JR. &H. ZMsEL., Tim AMERICAN JuRY (1966).
17. Waiver may result from the promise of an early trial to the plaintiff, coupled
with a binding general offer to waive from insurance companies who, for political reasons,
might not want to antagonize the court. Clearly, a sufficiently high statutory fee for filing
a jury request might have a similar effect.
KALVEN, JR.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/2
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Settlement During Trial. One event that drastically shortens trial time
is settlement during trial. However, the value of that remedy, if any, is
impaired by two circumstances. First, not much is known about the mechanics
of reaching a settlement. Second, unless a court's calendar system is quite
flexible the time gained by prematurely ending the trial will often be lost
to the court because another case is not readily available. Settlements can be
successfully encouraged. Past studies indicate, for example, that the appointment of an impartial medical expert increases chances of settlement during
trial. Although permitted in many jurisdictions, such appointments are
nonetheless rare; the tradition of adversary experts is deeply rooted. Moreover, there remains some legitimate doubt as to whether this type of medical
expertise is indeed objectively so well established that it justifies the aura
that an "impartial" expert is bound to impart before a jury. 8 Judges rightly
complain that settlements "at the steps of the courthouse" - either shortly
before or after opening of the trial -are an unconscionable misuse of the
court's time. Some lawyers settle their cases at the very last minute, either
because they believe they get a better settlement at that time or simply because
they were not familiar with the case until it reached trial. In any event,
these settlements gravely impair the smooth functioning of the courts, and
learning how to avoid them would be valuable. A change in the rules of
lawyer cost assessment, discussed below, would help. 19 If a court were to
announce and strictly adhere to a rule under which the court would not lend
its authority or time to settlement negotiations during the first trial day,
positive effects might result. While such a policy might produce some shortrange setback, it eventually might force earlier settlements for litigants who
do not seriously intend to try their cases. Again, this policy is one that a
court should implement on a trial basis so that all courts could learn from
its experience. 20
Split Trial. One of the more effective devices for shortening the trial time
is the separate or split trial, in which the jury decides first the issue of
liability. Only if liability is affirmed does the jury hear evidence on and decide
the amount of damages. On the average, such separation saves twenty per
cent of the court's trial time. This saving results partly from the approximately one-half of the cases in which the jury finds no liability and partly
from the increased tendency to settle once liability is established. 2' It has
been argued, however,22 that such separation prevents the jury from engaging

18. Cf. H. ZssIr., H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, note 1 supra, ch. 11.
19. See notes 82-36 infra and accompanying text.
20. The Chicago court will attempt to solve this problem by pretrying, once more,
all cases immediately before they are scheduled for trial and then refusing to allow the
trial court to be used as a forum for settlement. The experiment was scheduled to begin
Sept. 1, 1970. See also note 31 infra.
21. See, e.g., Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trial and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis,
76 HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1968).
22. Cf. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND L. REV. 881 (1961).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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in its acknowledged practice of relaxing its liability criteria where damages
are large. Although it is too early to evaluate this argument, preliminary
evidence from jury data does not suggest that a jury would engage in such
practice significantly more often than a judge trying the case without a jury.2s
In any event, courts could guard against stultifying the normal inclinations
of juries and rescue this powerful timesaver simply by advising the jury, at
the outset of the liability trial, of the nature of the injury claimed by one side
and disclaimed by the other. Conceivably, the nature of the injury might even
be partly stipulated. Such an announcement would also equalize the position
of plaintiffs whose injuries are plainly visible to the jury with plaintiffs whose
injuries are not visible.
Faster Trials. Other suggestions have considered the reduction of trial
time, perhaps by reducing the latitude allowed by some courts in voir dire
examinations. 24 Moreover, courts might increasingly insist upon stipulation
of facts prior to trial, a practice that has enabled tax courts, for instance,
to operate with great expedience. Here again, trial lawyers fear that a jury
will be less impressed by a stipulated fact than by one presented in full.
Such concern might be mistaken, however, and experimentation along these
lines would seem worthwhile.- Quite aside from such specific suggestions,
there exists little doubt that some judges try their cases more expeditiously
than others and that some courts are performing better than others. Cases
in the New York (Manhattan) court, for instance, take substantially more
time to try than do comparable cases in New Jersey. 26 It would seem worthwhile to study this problem in detail so that courts may learn to try cases
expeditiously and well. Some court time is wasted here that could be pried
loose.
Simpler Tort Laws. Attention should also be directed to a problem that
is not usually regarded as connected with the delay problem. Every refinement
in the law necessarily increases the number of decision points, thus augmenting the necessary evidence and, accordingly, the length of trials. "What
is happening in the course of the law is an almost endless increase in the
number of decision points, usually without much regard to the consequences
that that increase will have on the legal system." 27
23. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
24. On the whole, trial lawyers prefer latitude; many of them believe they win their
cases (if they do) during voir dire, partly by doing the smart selecting and partly by
putting the jurors into what they consider the "right frame of mind."
I have never heard a good argument explaining why elaborate voir dire proceedings are
in the interest of justice. If counsel on both sides are equally skilled, their effectiveness will
cancel out; and if one should indeed win only because he knows better how to select jurors
sympathetic to his side, this does not seem a good ground for allowing a litigant to win.
25. Pretrial is, of course, expected to accomplish this aim. However, the little experimental evidence that exists does not show any effect. Cf. M. RxOSENBRO, Tim PRmTA.
CONFERENCE AND EFFECrVE JusrcE 52 (1964).
26. See, e.g., H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, note 1 supra, ch. 9.

27. J. FRANK, THE CASE FOR RAmCAL REFORM, LECTURES
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/2
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Route 3: Fewer Cases to Trial
Special Laws for Automobile Cases. Here again, one radical remedy or,
more precisely, a number of such remedies have been offered, beginning with
the proposal to remove all automobile accident claims from the courts to an
agency fashioned after workmen's compensation boards. The more prominent
of these proposals- already introduced into several state legislatures- was
made by Professors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell in late 1964. Their
proposal would introduce a type of insurance that entitles the victim of an
automobile accident a minimum compensation (up to 10,000 dollars) for
personal injury damages (but not for pain and suffering) without regard to
fault. Only damages in excess of such claims would go to the courts in the
28
traditional manner.
Eliminating the need to prove fault for automobile accident claims under
10,000 dollars would undoubtedly reduce litigation drastically, particularly
in courts of limited jurisdiction whose awards cannot exceed this amount.
The extent to which this plan would eliminate litigation in courts of
unlimited jurisdiction would be an appropriate goal of study. In any event,
the plan would be a radical remedy for the delay in our courts.
The total transfer of all automobile cases to an administrative board, of
course, would cure delay almost overnight, and might well confront us with
some unemployment in the courts. Quite dearly, abandoning the fault principle in automobile cases, or the removal of all these cases, are such formidable
and radical proposals that their discussion far transcends the present article.20
The concern here is with more modest remedial actions.
Increase Settlements. As a practical matter, courts have concentrated on
only one avenue towards reducing the number of cases, namely, encouraging
litigants to settle. The devices range from modest pretrial conferences to mass
pretrials, special settlement marathons, and calling particularly recalcitrant
insurance company defendants on the carpet. Certainly the settlement process
is already extraordinarily effective. With variations, not more than one to
three out of every hundred personal injury claims ever reach the trial stage.80
Query, however, whether much potential remains in the system for an
increase in settlements?
Ideally, a court should merely invite the litigants to settle and offer its
good offices. There should be only one pressure for settlement: the prospect,
or threat, of a speedy trial. An up-to-date court needs no announcement to
convey the message.
The most widely used settlement device is obligatory pretrial. The judge
who conducts it has the satisfying experience of settling in one day more cases
OF CALIFORNIA 69 (1969).
28. See Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile
Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REv. 329 (1964).
29. See, e.g., C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERLS ON TORTS ch. 11 (2d
ed. 1969).
30. See H. ZisERL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCGHOLZ, supra note 1, at 117; Rosenberg &
Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1115 (1959).
EARL WARREN LEGAL CENTER, UNIVERSITY
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than he could try in a month. However, evidence indicates that many of
these cases would have been settled regardless of pretrial. Data emanating
from one of the few controlled experiments ever made in the field of
judicial administration showed that obligatory pretrial is counterproductive.
It costs court time yet fails to settle more cases than the much less timeconsuming optional pretrial,which offers pretrial only if one of the litigants
demands it. 31

More interesting and promising opportunities for increasing settlements
might arise through reappraisal of the prevailing system that allocates the
costs of trial. Presently, costs are typically allocated as follows: plaintiff's
counsel, on a contingent fee arrangement, pays his own costs if he loses; if
he wins, his winning client pays him. 32 Defendant's counsel-win or lose-is
always paid by his client.3 3 This situation may encourage some lawyers to try

a claim that has a relatively small chance of winning if the penalty for losing
is small, unless his time is fully taken up with cases that promise greater
remunerative possibilities.3A number of schemes have been proposed to increase the risk of the
litigant who refuses his opponent's settlement offer and then, in the subsequent
trial, fails to obtain more than the offer he had refused. The simplest
of these plans would assess costs for the opposing lawyers to the party who
had refused the offer and insisted on trial, which in retrospect proved superfluous.35 Such a scheme-again, disregarding its intrinsic merits or demeritsis likely to reduce the incidence of trial. To ensure that it does, however,
and to evaluate its effectiveness, a rational legal system should persuade one
jurisdiction to introduce such a cost assessment scheme on an experimental
basis so that other jurisdictions could learn from the experience. 36
Miscellaneous Devices. Some court systems require a certificate of readiness, in which the litigants declare that they have made every effort to settle
the case, but have failed and are now ready for trial. However, evidence has
31. M. ROSENBERG, note 25 supra. When Rosenberg compared a random sample of New
Jersey cases with obligatory pretrial to those with optional pretrial no differences in the
settlement ratios emerged. However, whether total abolishment of pretrial would reduce
the rate of settlements is a question to which the answer is not clear and one that would
deserve further study.
32. It is still largely a matter for speculation as to whether and to what extent juries
calculate this expense into their award.
33. There are minor exceptions to the rule. Statutory filing fees, fees for jury requests
can be recovered from the opponent who lost.
34. In contrast, the losing party in most continental European systems-plaintiff or
defendant-must pay the costs of the lawyers on both sides. In addition, the losing party
must also pay court costs, which depend on the number of pages of complaint, answer and
other briefs, and on the number of trial hours. All of these fees (and incidentally also
lawyer fees) are graduated according to the size of the claim. Such a system obviously shifts
the calculus: claims with marginal chances of recovery will not be pursued because of the
risk of paying costs to the other side
35. See Mause, Winner Takes All: A Reexamination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA
L. REv. 26 (1969).
36. See H. Zaisa, H. KALVEN, Ja. & B. BucHHoLz, note 1 supra, ch. 21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/2

10

Zeisel:
CourtsLAW
for Methuselah
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA

[Vol. XXMI

not supported the contention that the certificate increases the number of
settlements.8,
Proposals have been made to charge the defendant, if found liable, interest
on the award from the day of the accident or suit. Whatever the equitable
merits of this proposal, it too would not increase settlement.38
Recently, an eminent advocate has argued for the more frequent use of
summary judgment on the pleadings: 39
Of all of the correctional procedural devices, summary judgment
is the one best calculated to reduce court dockets. The vanguard position . . . was taken by the late Judge Charles E. Clark, the draftsman
of the rules which include the remedy . . . but I would . . . push the
use of the remedy beyond the point to which he was ready to go.
EPILOGUE

All, or almost all, of the possible remedies for court delay have been
listed in systematic order. If the removal of court congestion were a simple,
straightforward problem, like developing a super bomb or going to the moon,
all would be well. Then, wherever a court was in arrears, somebody would
sit down and put numbers to the basic workload equation described earlier.
He would begin by putting down:
(1) how many judge hours it will take to dispose of the pending
backlog cases, assuming no change in court rules or trial procedures;
(2) how many judge hours it will take, again assuming no change, to
dispose of the current annual input of cases, the cases expected next year
and the year thereafter;
(3) any remedy that, if adopted, would reduce either the number of
current or backlog cases requiring trial or the time needed to try these
cases, and hence would reduce the number of required judge hours as
estimated under (1) and (2) above.
Our hypothetical man would then put numbers to the other side of the
equation:
(4) how many judge hours will be in fact available this year, next
year, and the year thereafter. These judge hour figures are the composite
products of the number of available judges, times the number of their
working days per year, times the number of their working hours per day,
minus the number of hours that for one reason or other they cannot spend
on trying cases.
Once he has answered these four questions, our man knows that if the total
number of available judge hours:
37. Id. ch. 14.

38. Id. ch. 12.
39. J. FRANK, supra note 27, at 161.
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(a) is smaller than required to dispose of the current input of cases
(2 above), the court will fall further into arrears and its delay will increase
at a predictable rate.
(b) if it is larger than needed for disposing of the current input (2
above), the court's delay will decline. The rate of decline is easily estimated: it will take as many years to remove the back log, as the excess
of available judge hours (over 2 above) is divisible into the judge hours
needed to remove the backlog (above 1),4 and if the available judge hours
are just sufficient to dispose of the current input of cases (2 above) the
delay will remain unchanged.
If it is all that simple, then why does no court in the country-not a single one,
if I am not mistaken-proceed in this fashion? The answer is complicated
and strange, but its main point is simple: Nobody cares sufficiently.
When Delay in the Court-' was published in 1959, one of Chicago's newspapers decided to arouse public opinion, first by an editorial about our study
and then by publishing every single day for a full week something about
Chicago's frightfully delayed courts. 42 When the week was over the
newspaper had established a record: never before had it raised an issue to
which public response turned out to be absolutely nil. "How is this possible?"
one might ask. Initially, the defendant insurance companies and their lawyers
-however much they might protest this allegation-do not mind a situation
in which they can say to a plaintiff: "If you don't like what we offer, come
back in five years." Then there are the plaintiffs; a few do not mind waiting
because they have means of their own; some, if they cannot wait but have a
good case, are carried by their lawyers; a handful will even get an advanced
trial date. However, the bulk of the plaintiffs will settle a long time before
they could have their trials, partly because they need the money and partly
because they find the insurance companies eager to settle, albeit at their
price. The individual plaintiff is unable to perceive that what he gets in
settlement, by the laws of economics is less than what he would get if the
insurance companies were confronted with an early trial date. The plaintiffs'
lawyers also do not find this situation altogether disagreeable; whatever
burden the delay imposes on them, the cases to be tried in two, three, four,
or five years guarantee them an income for years ahead. Finally, whoever
would want to change the situation would have to take on the courts, something few lawyers care to do. As a result, the sum total of the dissatisfaction
of the litigants or potential litigants is imperceptible.
The duty to remedy the situation, therefore, evolves, as one might have
always thought, on the courts and only on them. Why they fail to act is more
40. Since only (b) offers any mathematical difficulties, an example will be helpful: (1)
needed for current input ....

10,000 judge hours; (2) needed for backlog disposal ....

5,000 judge hours; (4) available for backlog disposal .... 11,000 judge hours. The excess of
(11,000 - 10,000-) 1,000 judge hours is 1/5 of the amount required to dispose of the
backlog, hence the delay will be removed within 5 years.
41. H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, note 1 supra.
42. Chicago Tribune, March 27-April 3, 1969 (various sections and pages).
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difficult to understand than why the litigants and their lawyers tolerate the
delay. The problem begins with the difficulty of persuading judges, however
learned in the law and however devoted to the proper running of the court,
43
to share the power of court administration with expert administrators.
There is also the difficulty of persuading judges that it might be necessary
to count the judge hours actually available for trial. Finally, there is the
danger that judges will believe the installation of a computer will solve all
problems. A computer is, however, no substitute for putting numbers to
the workload equation because, by itself, it does not solve a single problem.
These are the main difficulties. There are others: almost every court
believes that its delay problem is utterly unique and is ready to reinvent
the wheel time after time. Parochialism rules the field; cooperation between
states, or even between courts within the same state, is rare. Yet cooperation
is essential if one court is to learn from the successes and failures of others.
Given the triviality of the problem and the importance of solving it,
there is something truly sinister about the unwillingness or incapability of
some of our courts to fulfill their primary administrative duty. It will not
suffice for them, as some have attempted, to point the finger at others, at such
alleged culprits as the bar or the legislature. The first court that puts before
the public a dear, honest accounting of its workload, its capabilities, its needs,
and couples it with an unequivocal commitment to remove the backlog is
bound to succeed. But where is that court?

43. The emphasis is on sharing the power. There are many able court administrators
around and more are being groomed in an Institute for Court Managements sponsored by
the American Bar Association with the help of a Ford Foundation grant.
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